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Perspective is one of the component parts of reality. Far from being a disturbance of its fabric, 
it is its organizing element. ... Every life is a point of view directed upon the universe. Strictly 
speaking, what one life sees no other can. ... Reality happens to be, like a landscape, 
possessed of an infinite number of perspectives, all equally veracious and authentic. The sole 
false perspective is that which claims to be the only one there is.  
(Ortega y Gasset 1961 [1923]: 90f) 
 
 
Abstract Modern societies depend on a growing production of scientific knowledge, which is 
based on the functional differentiation of science into still more specialised scientific 
disciplines and subdisciplines. This is the basis for the paradox of scientific expertise: The 
growth of science leads to a fragmentation of scientific expertise. To resolve this paradox, the 
present paper investigates three hypotheses:  1) All scientific knowledge is perspectival.        
2) The perspectival structure of science leads to specific forms of knowledge asymmetries.   
3) Such perspectival knowledge asymmetries must be handled through second order 
perspectives. We substantiate these hypotheses on the basis of a perspectivist philosophy of 
science grounded in Peircean semiotics and autopoietic systems theory. Perspectival 
knowledge asymmetries are an unavoidable and necessary part of the growth of scientific 
knowledge, and more awareness of this fact can help avoid blind and futile struggles between 
scientific perspectives, and direct efforts toward more appropriate ways of handling these 
fundamental knowledge asymmetries. Concretely, we show how different kinds of scientific 
knowledge, expertise, disagreement and learning can be correlated to the perspectival 
structure of science, and propose how polyocular communication based on (second order) 
observations of the observations made by specialised perspectives can be used to handle such 
perspectival knowledge asymmetries. This can help overcome the observed problems in 
carrying out cross-disciplinary research and in the collective use of different kinds of 
scientific expertise, and thereby make society better able to solve complex, real-world 
problems.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The ever-increasing production and usage of specialised knowledge is an indispensable condition 
for a knowledge society, but the mere production of specialised knowledge will not bring society to 
thrive and prosper; specialised knowledge needs to be communicated in such a way that it can be 
utilized, enter into democratic processes and decisions, and create societal value (Kastberg 2007). 
Kastberg states that “knowledge asymmetries” tend to emerge at a rate corresponding to the growth 
of knowledge, and that asymmetries “are no longer limited to the prototypical ones between social 
classes, between institutionalized social roles such as expert and ‘layman’ or political institutions of 
power such as ‘authority’ and ‘subject’. They also emerge within institutions themselves, between 
‘experts’ with different agendas or of different persuasion, political or otherwise.” Furthermore, 
Kastberg suggests that knowledge asymmetries are an indicator that the knowledge potential of 
society is not synthesized and exploited as well as it could (ideally) have been, and that this is 
probably the issue for a knowledge society. 
This is where the present paper takes its starting point. In Kastberg’s list of knowledge 
asymmetries there are not only different asymmetries, but different forms of asymmetries, which 
lead to different types of problems for society (though we do not presume that knowledge 
asymmetries are always problematic). The first type is ordinary problems of knowledge 
asymmetries, such as the differences between experts and laymen that are well known in the context 
of knowledge transfer (e.g. Ko et al. 2005). These problems may be difficult, but can be solved by 
the same measures that lead to the asymmetry: the layman must gain more knowledge to ‘catch up’ 
with the expert. The second type is dilemmas, asymmetries between authority and subject such as 
the power asymmetries between principals and agents in business exchanges (Sharma 1997). These 
problems cannot be resolved only by the measures of knowledge transfer or ‘learning what the other 
knows’, since this leads to the other horn of the dilemma, increasing the conflict that is involved. 
The third type of problems is paradoxes, which are connected with the burgeoning number of 
asymmetries between experts with different focus and different agendas that Kastberg (2007) 
pointed out. The paradox of this form of knowledge asymmetries is that the growth of knowledge in 
modern societies necessarily leads to fragmentation of knowledge. One cannot solve this kind of 
problems by way of the means and distinctions that constitute them, this will only reinforce the 
paradox; generating more knowledge will only increase the fragmentation of knowledge and create 
more asymmetries. To resolve a paradox you need to transgress the framework in which the 
paradox exists.   
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Based on pragmatic philosophy, we suggest that knowledge cannot, and should not, be 
separated from its basis in learning, cognition and inquiry (e.g. Dewey 1991 [1938], Alrøe 2000). 
The task for the present paper is therefore to analyse the cognitive and perspectival structure of 
scientific learning, as a basis for investigating the paradox of scientific expertise: that the growth of 
scientific knowledge leads to a fragmentation of scientific knowledge. We explore how the 
differentiation and specialisation of science and expertise leads to what we call perspectival 
knowledge asymmetries, and what this means for the communication of scientific knowledge, and 
we provide a framework to understand and handle such perspectival asymmetries and the resulting 
communication failures and scientific disagreements. The practical aspiration is that this pluralist 
and perspectivist (but not relativist) framework can serve as a helpful basis for working across 
disciplinary perspectives in science and for using different kinds of scientific expertise in society.  
 
2 Background: The differentiation of scientific knowledge 
 
According to the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann modern society is differentiated into 
independent, communicative function systems, such as the economic system, the political system, 
the legal system, the scientific system and the religious system. (Luhmann 1995, 1997: 707ff). The 
functionally differentiated systems are autopoietic and operationally closed through self-referential 
processes, and each system functions as a media for communication and forms a distinct 
perspective for observation in society. Parallel to the functional differentiation of society, there has 
been a differentiation of scientific disciplines (Stichweh 1992, Luhmann 1990, 446ff). Over time, 
science has differentiated from the unspecialised natural philosophy of the past into specialised 
disciplines like physics, biology, psychology, economics and sociology, and the disciplines are 
continuously differentiating into more specialised sub-disciplines or different ‘schools of thought.’ 
Furthermore, new disciplines are still being formed based on the academisation of professions in 
society like nursing, and the emergence of new technologies like biotechnology.    
The differentiation of science is both an answer to the growing complexity of society and a 
source of new complexity that poses a challenge to the use of science and expertise in society. 
When society is faced with a complex problem like climate change, environmental pollution, 
sustainable food production or life style diseases, there is a need to draw on a range of different 
disciplines spanning the conventional distinctions between natural, social and human sciences. 
There has therefore been a rising call for cross-, multi-, inter- or transdisciplinary science as a tool 
to solve complex real-world problems, and increasing attention to the combined problem of the 
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differentiation of science and the increasing complexity of the systemic challenges to modern 
societies (e.g. Pennington 2008, Pohl and Hirsch Hadorn 2008).  
However, in the scientific literature there is also a growing recognition that cross-disciplinary 
cooperation is very difficult to perform successfully, in particular when the disciplines focus on 
very different aspects of the problem such as causal mechanics, flow processes, signs, values and 
social relations, or have very different agendas. This confirms our own experiences. The different 
disciplines involved do not agree on solutions to the problem, or even on what the problem is, and 
often they disagree on essential questions such as what is scientific and what is good science. In 
spite of good wills and many ambitions to the contrary, there are fundamental problems in 
communicating and mediating between different scientific disciplines, in particular where there is 
no common theoretical framework, and often the cooperation is constrained by the hegemony of 
one discipline at the cost of the others (e.g. Miller et al. 2008, Bracken and Oughton 2006, Harrison 
et al. 2008, Pennington 2008). The more ambitious the collaboration is, in terms of using and 
integrating very different scientific perspectives in solving real, complex problems, the more 
difficult the task.  
 Differentiation increases the complexity that science can handle overall, by reducing the 
observational complexity that each perspective must handle. This marginalisation of complexity 
makes differentiation a very powerful mechanism in science; the specialised perspectives offer 
consistent, effective and accurate knowledge in the context of their particular, delimited research 
world and refined tools of observation. This is the reason why a genuine reintegration that ‘un-
differentiates’ scientific perspectives is, in general, neither possible nor desirable – the strength of 
independent scientific perspectives is needed. There are of course many examples of theoretical 
syntheses in science, like the neodarwinian synthesis and relativity theory, but such local syntheses 
do not negate the general processes of differentiation and the overall disunity of science (Kitcher 
1999). Indeed, the limited reducibility of theories leads to a pluralistic epistemology of science with 
complementing truths on different cognitive levels (Rorhlich 1988).  
On this background we claim that perspectival knowledge asymmetries are an unavoidable 
and necessary effect of the growth of scientific knowledge. And we suggest that the issue of 
perspectival knowledge asymmetries can be analyzed philosophically by investigating the 
perspectival nature of science. In the following three sections we will pose three hypotheses on the 
relation between scientific knowledge and perspectives, explain what they mean, and examine 
whether and how they can be substantiated.  
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The three hypotheses are: 
1. All scientific knowledge is perspectival. 
2. The perspectival structure of science leads to specific forms of knowledge asymmetries. 
3. Such perspectival knowledge asymmetries must be handled through second order perspectives.  
 
3 The perspectivist approach to science and cognition 
 
The first hypothesis is that all scientific knowledge is perspectival. This means that scientific 
knowledge is always created in perspectives, and that a perspective is not only a means of 
observation, but also an ‘apparatus for learning’. The differentiation of science is not only a 
differentiation of social systems, but also a cognitive or epistemic differentiation into specialised 
scientific perspectives, and the first step in our examination of this hypothesis is to investigate the 
science as an observation and learning process (cf. Alrøe 2000).   
 
3.1 The cognitive and perspectivist view of science 
 
There is a growing recognition that the context established by scientific disciplines, schools and 
methodological approaches is decisive for the focus and the kind of observations that can be made 
by science. This contextual and pluralist conception of science has been nurtured by the ideas about 
the incommensurability of successive scientific theories launched by Paul Feyerabend and Thomas 
Kuhn. In recent years there has been a rising interest in cognitive approaches within philosophy of 
science, where the focus is on scientific models and representation rather than theories and truth 
(e.g. Giere 1988, 1994, 2004, Cartwright 1999, van Fraassen 2008). And lately, Ronald Giere 
(2006a, 2006b) has developed this cognitive understanding of science into a ‘scientific 
perspectivism’ proper.  
Perspectivism has had a long but marginal presence in philosophy with roots in Kant and 
Nietzsche (e.g. Palmquist 1993, Anderson 1998, Hales and Welshon 2000). But Giere was the first 
to develop a fully perspectival philosophy of science. While Giere has mainly developed the 
perspectivist approach in the context of natural science, we here explore it as a general approach to 
science in its wider continental sense, which includes natural, social and human sciences. The 
perspectivist view of science can be characterized plainly in a few sentences: There is no outside 
perspective on the world. All knowledge comes from a certain perspective. All learning happens in 
concrete perspectives on the world, which are part of the world, and which can themselves be made 
objects of observation. This fairly banal insight contains strong implications for how we think about 
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scientific expertise, scientific disagreement and the role of science in society, and for our ideas 
about scientific norms. 
A discipline, or more often a subsystem or ‘school’ within a discipline, is an example of a 
scientific perspective. A scientific perspective harbours certain concepts, theories, classifications, 
instruments, problems, etc. that delimit and focus the observational field, and make possible the 
observation of certain phenomena and aspects (Figure 1). The defining characteristic is that a 
scientific perspective is an autopoietic system that is reproduced and refined through internal 
processes (Alrøe 2000). Tacit knowledge in form of implicit values, embodied knowledge and 
practices are part of what makes up a scientific perspective (cf. Collins 2010), and they are tacit 
precisely because this is part of what makes a scientific perspective effective. In order to explore 
these tacit cognitive and perspectival structures, we need to observe scientific perspectives as 
perspectives and not as abstract theories or social groups of scientists. 
 
Figure 1. A scientific perspective is characterised by specific concepts, instruments, problems, etc., 
which delimit and focus the observational field. 
 
The perspectivist view of science implies that there are many scientific truths about any 
complex problem, and from a philosophy of science point of view the question is not how to select 
the correct one, but how to appreciate and use the non-unifiable plurality of partial knowledges 
(Longino 2006). All ontological claims are interwoven with the epistemological conditions for 
observation and the built-in values and norms that apply in the perspective where it is grounded 
(Alrøe and Kristensen 2002). Truths are perspectival, but this does not imply that any truth can be 
as good as any other, or that there is no difference between expertise and taste. The distinct, 
collective-learning character of science is manifest in the foundational methodological ideas, open 
Focus
Delimitation
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inquiry, systematic observation and critical approach, which establish the excellence of science in 
the production of knowledge. 
 
3.2 The semiotic understanding of scientific perspectives 
 
The perspectivist approach described here builds on a thoroughly semiotic understanding of a 
scientific perspective (and in this respect it goes beyond Giere’s scientific perspectivism). A key 
element in this approach is the distinction between phenomena and noumena that Kant established 
in modern philosophy. Phenomena are things-for-us, things as they appear to us. Our knowledge is 
of phenomena and our objects reside in our phenomenal world. Noumena are the unknowable 
things-in-themselves. Scholars have long disagreed on this distinction between phenomena and 
noumena, but as Palmquist (1993, App. VIII) argues, Kant’s distinction between the noumenal and 
phenomenal realms is properly regarded as a perspectival distinction. The noumenal is not found as 
an object of experience, but only by its possible effect.  
In Charles S. Peirce’s semiotics we find the same distinction in an elaborated theory of 
representation and interpretation, which is readily applied in a perspectivist view of science. 
According to Peirce, a sign is something that stands to somebody, the interpretant, for something, 
the object, in some respect or capacity. And in his later works he stresses the semiotic relation 
between the immediate object as the sign represents it and the dynamical object or really efficient 
object that the immediate object refers to (e.g. Peirce 1998 [1908]: 482, CP: 8.343).  
Figure 2 illustrates the fundamental elements of scientific observation in form of a semiotic 
model of a scientific perspective observing (what it calls) a dairy cow. The model builds on Peirce’s 
theory of semiotics, the later development within biosemiotics (e.g. Uexküll 1982, Hoffmeyer 
1997), and Niels Bohr’s epistemological lesson from quantum physics: “Not only, of course, have 
we learnt that every observation involves a disturbance of the phenomena; we have furthermore 
realized that the whole concept of observation requires a separation between the object and the 
means of observation.” (Bohr 1931, cited in Favrholdt 1999: 521).  
It is important to stress that, in Peirce’s sense, there is no position from where we can observe 
the dynamical object as such; every perspective only adds to the number of immediate objects that 
refer to or point at the dynamical object. This is of course very different from a traditional realist 
conception which takes the thing in itself as the immediately present object. The representations of 
science can be tested by establishing observational situations (systematic observations, 
interventions, experiments) where the dynamical objects may ‘kick back’ (cf. the causal interactions 
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in Figure 2). But a dynamical object has a surplus of possibilities for observation, and any 
immediate object is, by necessity, a reduction based on a certain perspective.  
 
Figure 2. A semiotic model of a scientific perspective observing (what it calls) a dairy cow, showing 
the distinction between immediate and dynamical object and three key conditions for 
observation: the separation of the observer from the observed, the semiotic reference to the 
dynamical object, and the causal interaction with the dynamical object (modified from Alrøe 
2000). 
 
 
3.3 Communication across scientific perspectives 
 
By definition, it is a condition for cross-disciplinary science that the different perspectives observe 
the same thing, so to say, and the model in Figure 2 therefore points to a two-layered problem of 
communication across scientific perspectives: There is a need to point directly at some ‘real’ 
dynamical object to be shared in cross-disciplinary work, but we can only communicate signs 
(names, categories, models, etc.).  
The first layer is thus that the specialised languages of scientific disciplines and schools are 
not generally shared. Some perspectives are closely connected and share methods, models, theories 
and classifications, others are widely different and closed to each other. When one perspective 
speaks of ‘sustainable development,’ ‘soil quality,’ ‘farm,’ or ‘cow,’ it does not necessarily mean 
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the same as when another perspective uses the same term. To take a simple example, the common 
name ‘a cow’ can be generally shared but reveals fairly little of the dynamical object referred to. 
More specialised, perspectival names such as dairy cow (for production), year cow (for accounting), 
prize animal (for cattle shows), livestock unit (risk of eutrophication) and grazing pressure (for 
landscape conservation) point to different aspects of the dynamical object of a cow.    
The ‘rock bottom’ basis for cross-perspectival communication is the ‘common, everyday 
language’ (though this is still conditioned on common daily lives and therefore prone to cultural 
differences). The communicative paradox of cross-disciplinary science is thus that the common 
language is not sufficiently precise to handle the immediate objects of specialised perspectives, but 
more precise and specialised communication moves us away from the common language with 
which we can communicate across perspectives. This is a lesson to be learned from Peirce’s 
semiotics, and an idea that has been radicalized by Niklas Luhmann (1995: 143, emphasis in 
original): “The fact that understanding is an indispensable feature in how communication comes 
about has far-reaching significance for comprehending communication. One consequence is that 
communication is possible only as a self-referential process.” Communication across perspectives 
depends on structural couplings being established, and the differentiation and specialisation of 
scientific perspectives reinforces this key condition. 
The second layer of the problem is that since the same dynamical object will be observed and 
represented in different ways in different perspectives, it is not possible a priori to determine 
whether different scientific perspectives observe the same dynamical object, even though this is the 
presumed. Built into the conditions for observation there is a linkage between ways of interacting 
with the world and ways of representing the world, which makes it difficult, and in principle 
impossible, to share a common reference to a dynamical object across perspectives.  
Obviously, these deep-seated problems of communication do not mean that one cannot 
perform cross-disciplinary work, but they do mean that cross-disciplinary research is not a trivial 
matter.  
  
4 The perspectival structure of scientific knowledge and disagreement 
 
In the previous section we elaborated a fundamentally perspectival model of scientific observation 
and cognition that substantiated the hypothesis that all scientific knowledge is perspectival. The 
second hypothesis in this paper is that the perspectival structure of science leads to specific forms of 
knowledge asymmetries. This means that we are to expect different types of scientific knowledge, 
expertise, disagreement, and learning depending on how they relate to the perspectival structure.  
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Scientific disagreements are productive knowledge asymmetries, because they contribute to 
testing and developing scientific ideas. But the confusion of different kinds of scientific 
disagreement is not productive. By creating a better overview of what kinds of disagreement can be 
expected between different scientific perspectives, due to their perspectival differences, we can 
establish a better basis for assessing and handling other forms of scientific disagreement, which are 
due to scientific dishonesty, political spin, disciplinary hegemony, bad science, etc., and point out a 
route to overcome some of the pitfalls of cross-disciplinary research.  
In the following section we look at a few well known philosophical and sociological 
approaches to scientific disagreement and expertise, which we suggest can be understood as 
elements in a perspectivist understanding of science. 
 
4.1 Some well-known approaches to asymmetries in scientific knowledge and expertise  
 
Thomas Kuhn (1996 [1969]), in his Postscript to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, suggests 
the term ‘disciplinary matrix’ as a more precise term for ‘paradigm’ as it is used in his highly 
influential book. In this sense, Kuhn’s paradigms are examples of perspectives in our 
understanding. The disciplinary matrix includes symbolic generalizations (theories and laws), 
metaphysical paradigms (models, analogies, and metaphors), values, and exemplars (concrete 
problem-solutions), and these are similar to the elements of a scientific perspective that we have 
outlined. However, Kuhn and the rich tradition following Kuhn have a historical, diachronic focus, 
where the paradigms of normal science are interrupted by scientific revolutions or paradigm shifts 
within a single scientific field, whereas we in this paper focus on the synchronic disagreements and 
knowledge asymmetries across disciplines and perspectives in line with Maruyama (1974). The 
Kuhnian tradition generally focuses on theories and language, though there are some who take a 
more cognitive approach (Chen 1997, Andersen et al. 2006). Our approach here differs from the 
main tradition in having an explicit cognitive focus on what can broadly be called ‘the observational 
apparatus.’ Kuhn’s views on the incommensurability between consecutive paradigms correspond to 
the problems in integrating and communicating across perspectives in cross-disciplinary work that 
we have described in this paper. But where Kuhn uses a language metaphor, talking of the 
untranslatability between different paradigms (Chen 1997), our approach points out that the reason 
why it is in principle impossible and in practice more or less difficult to communicate across 
perspectives, is because each observational perspective has its own phenomenal world – its own 
representation of the world entailed in theories, models, concepts, classifications and examples. 
This is a deeper reason than language, tied into the specific observational apparatus and the specific 
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forms of interaction provided by it. Despite the common features, our synchronic and explicitly 
perspectivist approach leads to other questions and other answers than Kuhn’s. 
Harry Collins and following him a number of other researchers have investigated what the 
scientific practice means for expertise, and what scientific disagreement means for the role that 
expertise has in society (e.g. Collins 2004, Collins and Evans 2007). However, this work concerns 
in particular the opportunities for individual researchers to obtain expertise in a different field than 
their own, and not the general perspectival structures that are in focus in the present paper. Collins 
distinguishes between contributory expertise, possessed by those who participate in everyday 
activities and development of the field (and who therefore possess the necessary tacit knowledge to 
contribute, cf. Collins 2010), and interactional expertise, which is characteristic of those who can 
communicate fully with the field, based solely on explicit knowledge, but who are not able to 
actually take part in and contribute to the field. There is in general some degree of interactional 
expertise among scientists (especially within each of the main areas of science), which helps make 
the cross-disciplinary cooperation not impossible, but merely difficult. But in general, it takes a 
long time to obtain interactional expertise in a new field, and due to the differentiation and 
specialisation of science it is hardly possible today to become a ‘modern renaissance man’ with 
interactional expertise in a range of widely different fields. Interactional expertise therefore cannot 
be considered a general solution to the cross-disciplinary conundrum. Neither can the ‘trading 
zones’ of Galison (1997: 803ff), which refer to scientific communities and not individuals, because 
the focus here is on language and not on scientific perspectives as a whole.  
Thomas Gieryn (1983) investigates the actual delimitations of science from non-science that 
specific sciences use in the pursuit of their professional goals. Such boundary-work can be a 
problem in cross-disciplinary work, because some scientific perspectives are marginalized as non-
scientific by other, more esteemed and powerful perspectives. See e.g. Hinrichs (2008) for a 
discussion of boundary work in agrifood studies.  
 
4.2 A perspectivist framework for types of knowledge, expertise, disagreement and learning 
 
The perspectivist understanding of science provides a common framework for discussing the 
existing approaches to handling different forms of asymmetries in knowledge and learning. 
In Table 1 (line 1-3) the paradigms and scientific revolutions of Kuhn, Collins’ contributory 
and interactional expertise, and the boundary-work of Gieryn are placed in a perspectival 
framework together with a number of other differences between types of scientific knowledge, 
disagreement and learning. For example, the kinds of disagreement to expect within a perspective 
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are the normal converging disagreements of science (line 1); when a perspective is being 
transgressed, we expect to see diverging disagreements that may transform or split up the 
perspective (line 2); whereas forms of unconnected ‘blind’ disagreements and communication 
failures are to expected between different perspectives (line 3).  
 
Table 1. Types of knowledge, disagreement and learning in relation to the perspectival 
structure of science. 
  Type of knowledge and 
expertise 
Type of disagreement Type of system learning 
process  
1. Within a perspective  Embodied and 
tacit knowledge,  
Paradigm, 
Contributory 
expertise 
Orthodox 
knowledge 
Converging 
disagreement 
Socializing, 
Reproducing and refining,  
Normal science 
2. Transgressing a 
perspective  
Heterodox 
knowledge 
Diverging 
disagreement 
Differentiation of science,
Scientific revolution 
3. Between perspectives 
(of first order) 
Acontextual knowledge, 
Interactional expertise 
Unconnected ‘blind’ 
disagreement, 
Communication failure 
‘Learning the language,’
Hegemony,  
Boundary‐work 
4. In a second order 
perspective 
Contextualised knowledge, 
Reflexive expertise 
Perspectival 
disagreement 
Second order polyocular 
communication 
 
 
This linkage of existing approaches to a comprehensive perspectivist framework may be 
helpful in itself, and it substantiates the hypothesis that the perspectival structure of science leads to 
specific forms of knowledge asymmetries. But the really novel in the perspectivist approach is that 
it points to structures beyond these existing approaches. It is only in a thoroughly perspectivist 
understanding of science that the possibility of a fourth form of knowledge, disagreement and 
learning shows up: second order perspectives based on observation of observation (Table 1: line 4); 
an idea that builds on constructivist and perspectivist approaches in second order cybernetics and 
social systems theory (Foerster 1984, Luhmann 1993). A second order perspective can potentially 
transcend the incommensurability of perspectives that are blind to each other (bearing in mind, 
however, the significance of tacit knowledge). Perspectival disagreement and reflexive expertise are 
thus based on the handling of contextual knowledge from first order perspectives in a second order 
learning process, which we call polyocular communication.  In the next section we describe how 
second order perspectives can be used to handle perspectival knowledge asymmetries. 
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5 Second order observation and polyocular communication 
 
The third and final hypothesis in this paper is that the perspectival asymmetries in Table 1, line 3 
and the ensuing problems in the communication of scientific knowledge must be handled through 
second order perspectives. This means that there is a need for new forms of scientific perspectives 
and learning processes that aim to observe the world by observing the observations of a range of 
specialised perspectives. A key question is then how these second order perspectives may look like, 
where they can be realised, and how they may be applied to the problems of knowledge asymmetry. 
In the following we will show how the hypothesis can be implemented in cross-disciplinary 
research and discuss the broader implications for the paradox of scientific expertise.  
 
5.1 The case of cross-disciplinary research 
 
In the first part of this paper we indicated the problems of carrying out crossdisciplinary 
research due to problems with asymmetries in communicating across different scientific 
perspectives with different immediate objects in form of theories, models, taxonomies and entities; 
uncertainties as to whether those immediate objects actually refer to a shared (dynamical) research 
object; and, possibly, different understandings of common concepts, different logics and rationales, 
different criteria of science and different societal and intentional contexts in form of values and 
interests.  
Figure 3 shows an example of such a problematic crossdisciplinary research project with four 
different specialised disciplinary perspectives on a farm enterprise (ignoring the second order 
perspective for now). In this (obviously simplified) example, agronomy is concerned with food 
production and observes yields on the farm, biology is concerned with nature and observes 
biodiversity in and off the fields, economy is concerned with markets and observes commodities 
from the enterprise, and sociology is concerned with culture and observes human interactions in and 
around the farm. In a concrete cross-disciplinary investigation of, say, nature quality in a farmed 
landscape, these disciplinary perspectives represent different interests in nature quality with very 
different ideas about what nature quality means, they have different methods for how nature quality 
is best investigated, different geographical and conceptual boundaries of farms and landscapes, and 
in the end they draw different conclusions based on different rationales.  
A common way to try to ensure the co-ordination of such crossdisciplinary research projects 
is to require that all the disciplines work on the same geographical study area. But a shared study 
area cannot ensure that the different perspectives observe the same dynamical object. Each 
 14
discipline has its own immediate objects, and one cannot force a disciplinary perspective to observe 
what it is not able to observe. In the example above, the biological perspective will look for nature 
quality in the small biotopes in hedges and ditches, where biodiversity in form of rare and 
threatened species may be found, and the agronomic perspective will look in the fields, where 
biodiversity in form of robust and plentiful species may support soil fertility and crop growth (cf. 
Tybirk et al. 2004).  
Another way to ensure co-ordination is to require that the disciplines establish a common pool 
of data, but this is a misguided method, since data are always observations from a certain scientific 
perspective. Treating data as context-free observations is therefore prone to generate 
misunderstandings and loss of insight; for instance all data may be interpreted from the perspective 
of one hegemonic discipline.   
A range of different approaches have been suggested to, in some more fundamental way, re-
unite science or (re-)integrate scientific disciplines in cross-disciplinary work, such as systems 
theory, complex modelling and various holistic frameworks. These efforts are often commendable, 
but we don’t think any of them provide a general approach to solve the fundamental problems of 
using very different kinds of science in an integrated way to solve complex real-world problems. 
Some approaches  ignore the power of differentiation and pluralism in science, and seek to re-unite 
science by promoting selected specialised perspectives as fundamental and sufficient in themselves, 
in a reductionist and hegemonic way. Others introduce a new holistic perspective, which ignores the 
specialised perspectives and the possibility of other holistic perspectives, and therefore is itself a 
kind of reductionism. For instance, Pohl and Hirsch Hadorn (2008) consider ‘systems thinking’ a 
constituting conceptual basis of an overall transdisciplinary research perspective. But there are a 
range of different systems frameworks; each system theory has its own perspective on complexity 
that observes certain types of problems; and the different system theories will leave different 
imprints on the answers gained (see e.g. Ramage and Shipp 2009, Midgley 2003). The choice of 
systems framework is not innocent. 
A disciplinary integration proper may be a relevant target in specific cases where the 
objective is to create an integrated perspective on a technological field such as nanotechnology 
(Johnson 2009). Here, a new, separate perspective is established, where specific theories, models, 
values, logic and exemplars are selected and the research field determined. However, the idea of 
transdisciplinary integration of a first order, without the selections and delimitations inherent in the 
formation of a new specialised scientific perspective, is incongruous. As a general solution, first 
order (re-)integration of specialised scientific disciplines is neither possible, nor desirable. In order 
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to establish a general framework for solving real-world problems through crossdisciplinary 
research, we need to look at second order perspectives and how they may be implemented.  
 
5.2 Separate, second order perspectives for polyocular communication  
 
But where, then, may such second order perspectives be placed, what do they look like, and 
what is their function? First of all, we argue that there is a need for a separate, second order research 
process which observes the first order observations in their perspectival context (as illustrated in 
Figure 3). The specialised disciplines are generally not able to both reproduce and refine their own 
perspective and carry out second order observations of the different perspectives that are employed 
in cross-disciplinary work (including their own). It is fine to utilize and extend the interactional 
expertise, in Collins’ sense, that each researcher brings into the work, but while such individual 
cross-cutting expertise is helpful, it is not enough to underpin cross-disciplinary work.   
 
 
Figure 3. An example of a second order perspective on a farm enterprise based on (second 
order) observations of the observations of specialised disciplinary perspectives, and thus providing 
a basis  for polyocular communication and learning (modified from Noe et al. 2008). 
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Using a term first used by Magoroh Maruyama (1974, 1978, 2004) in cross-cultural and 
organization studies, we characterize such second order learning processes as polyocular 
communication. That is, a second order perspective does not directly observe the research object; it 
performs second order observations of observations made by the different first order scientific 
perspectives involved, and in this sense it manifests a multi-perspectival or polyocular view of the 
object, which can unfold a multidimensional space of understanding. The key activities in the 
second order research process is thus to 1) illuminate the involved perspectives and their conditions 
for observation, communication and learning, in order to 2) enable a contextualised communication 
of observations and analyses, which exposes how they are influenced by their perspectival and 
cognitive context and thus helps overcome perspectival knowledge asymmetries, and thereby 3) 
provide for a polyocular communication of the research results. The second order perspective is on 
the one hand a scientific perspective like any other, residing in a research group or a wider research 
community, but on the other hand it operates at a meta-level compared to first order scientific 
perspectives, and does not directly observe the research object. 
There is a need for separate resources to perform such second order research processes in 
practice. Concretely, this could for instance be organized in form of a separate work package in a 
cross-disciplinary research project, with its own funding and human resources. This does not mean 
that this process would necessarily be carried out by other researchers. It may well involve 
researchers from the different disciplinary perspectives, with the aim to utilize their intimate 
experience with their own perspective and to increase their awareness of the imprint that their 
perspective leaves on their observations, analyses and conclusions.  
 
6 Conclusions and prospects 
 
In conclusion, we need to resolve the fundamental paradox that the growth of science leads to a 
fragmentation of scientific expertise and growing knowledge asymmetries, in order to be able to 
establish a general framework for solving real-world problems through crossdisciplinary research; 
and to resolve the paradox we need to transgress the first order structure of scientific perspectives 
and incorporate second order perspectives.  
Scientific knowledge is perspectival, and scientific perspectives can provide consistent, 
effective and precise knowledge, but only on the basis of differentiation and specialisation. 
Perspectival knowledge asymmetries are therefore an unavoidable and necessary part of the growth 
of scientific knowledge. More awareness of this fact can help avoid futile struggles between 
scientific perspectives, and direct efforts toward more appropriate ways of handling these 
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fundamental knowledge asymmetries, such as the second order, polyocular approach to cross-
disciplinary research that we have outlined here. This goes beyond the typical non-integrated 
multidisciplinary approach, but it does not seek to integrate the different disciplines involved, nor 
form a new, integrated scientific perspective, even though it does bring some kind of integration in 
form of polyocular communication.  
This is not to say that polyocular communication cannot lead to new and more integrated 
models of the research object, or that the involved scientific perspectives cannot learn from the 
process and transform their own approach accordingly (and indeed, such second order learning 
processes are bound to promote interactional expertise among the involved researchers). But the 
successful application of a polyocular approach does not depend on such changes. In fact, the 
approach depends on clear and distinct perspectives where the context of observation can be 
unambiguously described (taking due account of tacit knowledge). At the same time, polyocular 
communication can only happen with reference to a shared dynamic object that, it is agreed, can be 
observed in different ways; and we must expect it to sometimes bring forth mutually excluding 
representations of the research object (complementary phenomena in Niels Bohr’s sense).    
Second order perspectives in some form can be of use not only in crossdisciplinary science, 
but wherever very different strands of scientific knowledge are used to help solve complex 
problems in society, and whenever different types of scientific expertise are used in education, 
business development, democratic debate and political decisions. Polyocular learning processes 
could help us overcome the paradox of scientific expertise by enabling us to handle perspectival 
knowledge asymmetries, and thus contribute to a more reflexive expertise and a less fragmented 
basis for democratic processes and societal decisions. 
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